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Recent Decisions
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION- EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION-INTERSCHOLASTIC SPORTS-The Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania has held that a state-wide high school athletic asso-
ciation by-law which prohibited females from competing and prac-
ticing against males violated on its face the equal rights amendment
to the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by its Attorney General,'
brought suit in commonwealth court2 against the Pennsylvania In-
terscholastic Athletic Association, a regulatory body for interscho-
lastic competition among most public senior and some junior high
schools in the state.' Plaintiff's equity complaint4 challenged the
constitutionality of article XIX, § 3B of the Association's by-laws,
which provided that girls should not compete or practice against
1. The Attorney General, as chief law enforcement officer of the state, has the duty to
enforce all laws of the Commonwealth. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 294 (1962).
In addition to his statutorily imposed duties, the Attorney General has all the powers and
attributes of an attorney general under the common law. Commonwealth v. Bardascino, 210
Pa. Super. 202, 232 A.2d 236 (1967) (the Attorney General has powers and duties outside those
enumerated in the Administrative Code and can investigate bribery charges against a magis-
trate). One of his responsibilities at common law is the protection of public rights. Common-
wealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936) (proper for the Attorney
General to act as special attorney in a criminal case upon request of local judge).
The instant case was the first in which the Attorney General sought enforcement of the
Pennsylvania equal rights amendment. His standing to sue was based on his parens patriae
interest in insuring that the by-laws governing the state's public high school students did not
offend the laws of the Commonwealth. Complaint at 1, Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975). See Commonwealth
v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (Commonwealth's interest in the education of its
citizens confers standing as parens patriae to challenge alleged discrimination in the school
system).
2. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334
A.2d 839 (1975). Commonwealth court has original jurisdiction in "[aill civil actions or
proceedings by the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity
. .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.401(a)(2) (Supp. 1975).
3. The Association has no jurisdiction in Philadelphia; its membership also includes some
private schools. The Association regulates interscholastic sports competition among its mem-
ber high schools in football, cross-country, basketball, wrestling, soccer, baseball, field
hockey, lacrosse, gymnastics, swimming, volleyball, golf, tennis, track, softball, archery and
badminton. 18 Pa. Commw. at 48, 334 A.2d at 840.
4. The Commonwealth sought declaratory relief in the form of preliminary and
permanent injunctions against enforcement of the by-law by the Association. Complaint at
5.
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boys in any athletic contest. The complaint alleged' that a sex-
based exclusion of female student athletes from the same opportuni-
ties afforded males violated both the equal rights amendment to the
Constitution of Pennsylvania6 and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.7
The Commonwealth completed a series of pre-trial procedural
volleys by filing a motion for summary judgment.' In granting the
motion,9 a majority of the court held article XIX, § 3B unconstitu-
tional on its face under the ERA. The court concluded that even if
proved, none of the offered justifications for the by-law could sus-
tain its legality.'0
Since there were no disputed issues of material fact," the court
advanced immediately to the question whether the Association's
sex-based classification of teams in interscholastic athletic competi-
tion violated the Pennsylvania ERA. The court began with a review
of leading ERA precedents ,which demonstrated consistent rejection
of sex-based classifications by the Pennsylvania courts. Conway v.
Dana" overruled the common law presumption that the father al-
ways carries the financial burden of child support after separation
5. Point 21 of plaintiff's complaint averred: "The [by-law] ... denies to female athletes
equal access to the training facilities and programs, coaching staff and athletic equipment
which is available to male athletes." Id. at 4.
The Commonwealth specifically excluded football and wrestling from its complaint against
the classification because such sports involve forceful physical contact for the purpose of
overpowering one's opponent. Id. at 3. The court's holding, however, included all sports
within the Association's purview. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 843.
6. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 [hereinafter referred to as ERA].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because the court disposed of the case on state constitu-
tional grounds, it did not address this question. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 840-41.
8. PA. R. Civ. P. 1501 made summary judgment available in this equity action. The
specific rule governing summary judgment is PA. R. Civ. P. 1035.
9. In addition to its attack on the by-law, the Commonwealth sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions against the Association's sponsorship of any discriminatory sports
program. It also requested that the defendant submit a plan for integration of the state-wide
athletic program. Complaint at 5. The court denied this supplemental relief because the
complaint specifically addressed only § 3B; moreover, the court believed its order would cure
the alleged discriminatory practices because they were directly related to the disputed by-
law. 18 Pa. Commw. at 53, 334 A.2d at 843.
10. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 841.
11. Id; Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970) (on a motion for summary
judgment, all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party); Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 437 Pa. 117, 262 A.2d 851 (1970)
(if there is no genuine issue as to a material fact, there is no logical reason to go to trial).
12. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
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or divorce. Prior to Hopkins v. Blanco,3 only the husband had the
right to recover damages for loss of consortium; Hopkins extended
that right to the wife. Henderson v. Henderson4 struck down a
section of the Commonwealth's divorce law 5 which awarded pay-
ment of alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses to the wife
alone. In Commonwealth v. Butler,"5 the court held unconstitutional
under the Pennsylvania ERA a portion of the Muncy Act which
required a minimum sentence for men, but not women, convicted
of crimes.
The Commonwealth maintained these holdings governed the by-
law in PIAA, since it operated to deny females equal access to edu-
cational experiences, athletic recognition and monetary rewards
solely because of their sex. 7 The Association urged that the present
case was distinguishable on several grounds, 8 none of which per-
suaded a majority of the court. Because the precedents cited by the
court dealt with sex-based deprivations of rights created by statute
or case law, they fit the literal language of the ERA: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."' 9 The
Association argued that there was no legally acknowledged right to
participate in interscholastic sports. Absent a legal right, defendant
claimed the precedents and the language of the amendment itself
indicated the ERA did not apply.20 The court agreed that there was
no fundamental right 1 to engage in interscholastic sports. The ERA,
however, called for "equality of rights under the law. 2 2 The court
considered this concept broad enough to include the Association's
activities, which had previously been deemed state action within
13. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
14. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (1955), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp.
1975). In the amended statute, the word "spouse" replaces "wife."
16. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974).
17. Complaint at 4-5.
18. Brief for Defendant at 47, Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
19. PA. CONST. art. I, §28 (emphasis added).
20. Brief for Defendant at 50.
21. 18 Pa. Commw. at 51, 334 A.2d at 842. The opinion indicates that the court did not
use "fundamental right" as a term of art in the context of a fourteenth amendment compel-
ling state interest analysis. Rather, the court was asserting that students were not entitled




the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.23 Once the state permit-
ted any sports participation, the manner in which it did so became
the subject of ERA scrutiny.2"
The Association nevertheless maintained that its sex-based clas-
sification, unlike those overturned by ERA precedents, was justified
because men generally possessed more athletic ability than women;
women had a greater opportunity to participate where the competi-
tion was among their own sex.25 The court was unmoved by this
argument, since it would justify total exclusion of girls who wished
to play a particular sport which their schools offered only to males.
Even if the high school sponsored a female team, a girl might be
forced to play beneath her appropriate level of competition."
In final defense of the classification, the Association argued that
in this context a distinction between sexes was reasonable because
different physical characteristics made competition between males
and females undesirable. The court responded that a greater or
lesser incidence of certain neutral characteristics justified classifica-
tion by those characteristics, but not by sex;27 if a girl were weak and
injury-prone, she could be properly excluded from competition be-
cause she was unskilled in athletics-but not because she was a
girl .21
In a brief dissent,2 9 Judge Bowman observed that the majority had
granted summary judgment too hastily; he would have heard the
evidence to determine whether there was a rational basis30 for the
sex-based classification. He questioned the majority's use of preced-
ent: the cited cases had his full support, but he felt they should not
control in this situation since it did not involve a recognized right.
Those cases had applied the ERA without explaining whether its
operation absolutely negated any classification by sex. The Judge
reasoned that the plaintiff had excluded contact sports from its
23. Harrisburg School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 453 Pa. 495,
501-02, 309 A.2d 353, 356-57, (1973) (state action found because Association was funded by
fees from public high schools and so, ultimately, by taxpayers).
24. 18 Pa. Commw. at 51, 334 A.2d at 842.
25. Id.; Brief for Defendant at 13.
26. 18 Pa. Commw. at 52, 334 A.2d at 842.
27. See Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), where the particu-
lar characteristic involved was economic capability.
28. 18 Pa. Commw. at 52, 334 A.2d at 843.
29. Id. at 53, 334 A.2d at 843 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
30. It is unclear whether Judge Bowman used the phrase "rational basis" in the equal
protection sense or whether he simply meant "justification" under some other test.
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complaint in anticipation of a ruling that in certain instances there
could be a justifiable basis for distinction between sexes. He feared
the majority had endorsed the former reading3' even though the
precedents did not necessarily require it.
Pennsylvania ERA decisions have followed a set pattern. 2 The
analysis begins with a finding that there has been state action
33
which has perpetuated a sex-based classification affecting a legally
protected right. Once it has made this threshold finding, the court
examines the classification to determine whether it violates the
ERA. In PIAA, the court was able to invoke the ERA because the
Association's activities had already been characterized as state ac-
tion.34 Although students had no statutory entitlement to participa-
31. 18 Pa. Commw. at 53-54, 334 A.2d at 843 (Bowman, J., dissenting). The court had
included football and wrestling in its order even though the defendant had had no opportunity
to submit evidence bearing specifically on those sports.
32. PIAA differs from the earlier cases in one important aspect. Before the classifications
in those cases could operate, the trier of fact had to make findings in an evidentiary hearing.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974) (decision on criminal
guilt); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974) (finding of negligence); Conway v.
Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974) (determination of economic capability). The ERA
question was usually considered only on appeal, since stare decisis locked the lower courts
into reapplying pre-ERA case law. PIAA was the first case to apply the ERA on a motion for
summary judgment. The Association argued there was a factual dispute concerning the
purpose of the by-law, including the debate among experts on whether boys and girls should
compete together and the hypothesis that segregated teams provide greater opportunity for
girls. Brief for Defendant at 24. It was clear, however, that the by-law flatly excluded female
students from competition with males on high school teams; the court felt this was the only
finding relevant to the question of law. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 841.
33. Like the federal equal rights amendment, the Pennsylvania ERA applies only to
activities practiced under the auspices of state action. 18 Pa. Commw. at 51, 334 A.2d at 842.
See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 905 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
It does not extend to private sex discrimination. 118 CONG. REc. 9570 (1972) (statement of
Judiciary Committee submitted by Senator Bayh).
34. In Harrisburg School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 453 Pa. 495,
309 A.2d 353 (1973), the Association had imposed sanctions on a high school following an
outbreak of violence at a football game. The school district argued that the censuring proce-
dure violated the fourteenth amendment. Before reaching the due process issue, the court had
to determine whether the Association's role constituted state action. See note 23 supra.
Harrisburg is distinguishable from PIAA, however, since the former concerned the lack of
procedural safeguards within the processes of the Association while the latter dealt with the
composition of teams within the schools themselves. Had the PIAA court considered sports
competition an integral part of the school curriculum, it might have found state action and
a statutory entitlement to participation under PA. CONST. art. III, § 14, which directs the
General Assembly to provide a system of public education that serves the needs of the
Commonwealth.
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tion in interscholastic sports, the state could not extend the oppor-
tunity on a discriminatory basis. 5 Yet it is unclear what standard
the court used in concluding that the by-law was unconstitutional
on its face. A broad reading of the opinion suggests an absolute
standard whereby classification by sex would never be permissible."
A narrower interpretation connotes a less stringent test, comparable
to an equal protection strict scrutiny analysis." Neither approach
was expressly adopted by the court. It did not articulate an absolute
ban against classification by sex, but its summary disposition of the
by-law supports that reading. 8 The resulting ambiguity might be
cured by inquiring into the legislative intent of the ERA.
The recorded legislative history39 of the Pennsylvania ERA does
not discuss whether it was intended to abolish all classification by
sex.40 By analogy, the history of the federal ERA" gives some indica-
35. This language parallels a fourteenth amendment due process analysis. See Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (procedural due process).
36. Quoting language from Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62
(1974), the majority stated, "The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a permis-
sible factor in the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities." 18 Pa.
Commw. at 50, 334 A.2d at 842.
37. At first the majority seemed willing to entertain defendant's justifications for the
classification, only to find the suggested rationales insufficient to overcome an apparent
presumption of discrimination. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 841.
38. Although the court did not unequivocably hold that under no conditions could there
be a rational basis for distinction between the sexes, the dissent maintained that reading was
inescapable. That contention was based on the inclusion of football and wrestling in the
court's order. Id. at 53-54, 334 A.2d at 843 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
39. The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on October 7, 1969. 2 PA.
LEGIS. J., 153d Sess. 1370 (1969) (House). It was reported as amended on November 12, id.
at 1487, and received its first consideration approximately one week later. Id. at 1501. The
House reconsidered the proposal on November 24. Id. at 1518. The bill passed on December
2. Id. at 1543. It reached the Senate Constitutional Changes and Federal Relations Commit-
tee that same day. PA. LEGIS. J., 153d Sess. 739 (1969) (Senate).
The Senate acted quickly on the proposed amendment during the 1970 Session. It was
reported as committed and first considered on March 10, 1970. PA. LEGIS. J., 154th Sess. 1038,
1043 (1970) (Senate). It was considered again on the following day, id. at 1052, and amended
and reconsidered within a week. Id. at 1082. The bill was finally signed in the Senate on April
29, 1970. Id. at 1156.
40. Legislative proposals and administrative regulations regarding the Pennsylvania ERA
reveal how state legislators and officials have interpreted its intent. Prior to PIAA, the state
Board of Education promulgated a regulation governing athletic programs in the public
schools. 22 PA. CODE § 5.25(e) (1974). The regulation, which is still in effect, provides separate
male/female sports programs but requires equal access to athletic facilities and coaching
staffs. Id. § 5.25(e)(2). It prohibits any rule that excludes girls from participation on boys'
teams, id. § 5.25(e)(4), and also endorses coeducational teams. Id. § 5.25(e)(3). These provi-
sions may indicate a willingness to accomodate an absolute interpretation of the ERA. For a
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tion of the proper test for determining the validity of a classification
under the amendment." Although the federal ERA does not articu-
late a particular standard, one can be inferred from certain classifi-
cations which were specifically excluded from ERA coverage.43 One
such exclusion allows reasonable classifications based on character-
istics that are unique to one sex." Another, derived from the consti-
tutional right to privacy,45 permits separation of public restrooms
and institutional sleeping facilities." The ERA's sponsors wished it
to promote equality between the sexes more vigorously than would
be possible under the traditional equal protection rational basis
test,47 but they recognized that in certain contexts the state had a
compelling interest in classification by sex. Since these exceptions
were justifiable to the framers of the federal ERA, it seems clear
that they did not intend the amendment should apply absolutely in
every case.
discussion of such administrative schemes see Comment, Sex Discrimination in Interscholas-
tic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 535 (1974).
More significantly, however, a bill has been introduced in the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly which proposes exclusion of high school athletics from the ERA's purview and approves
separate but equal athletic opportunity. Pa. H.R. 1074, 159th Sess. (1975). The proposal
echoes the rational basis test applied in Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930
(W.D. Pa. 1973), where the court upheld the same by-law at issue in PIAA in light of the
physiological and psychological differences between boys and girls. Due to the state constitu-
tional amendment procedure, the proposed modification of the Pennsylvania ERA cannot be
adopted before 1978. PA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1. The amendment was referred to and has
remained in the House Education Committee since April 22, 1975. PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, HISTORY OF SENATE AND HOUSE BILLs-HsToRY OF HOUSE BILLS AND
RESOLUTIONS 1975-1976, at A-126 (Sept. 22, 1975).
41. The proposed amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
42. It is unlikely that a rational basis test was intended to implement the ERA, since that
test has been traditionally used in sex discrimination cases brought under the equal protec-
tion clause.
43. The House Report on the ERA shows that "equality" does not require that women
and men be treated the same in all respects. Different treatment can be based on individual
attributes of the particular person, which might be found among members of both sexes. 118
CONG. REC. 9571 (1972) (majority report of the Committee on the Judiciary).
44. Maternity leave for female employees falls under this exception.
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. This exception also involves the state's power to regulate cohabitation and sexual
activity by unmarried persons. 118 CONG. REC. 9571 (1972) (majority report of the Committee
on the Judiciary).
47. The Supreme Court has suffered the criticism that it approaches sex discrimination
more diffidently than it does racial discrimination. Id. at 9569.
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Like PIAA, prior ERA cases" can be read as support for either an
absolute or less than absolute standard for the validity of a classifi-
cation under the amendment. Generally, the opinions maintain that
the ERA should operate to guarantee equality between men and
women 49 and eliminate distinctions based on sex.50 This language
may be dictum, however, since the classifications at issue could
have failed a less stringent test. Each opinion concerned a situation
in which extension of a benefit to one sex but not the other would
have been discriminatory per se under an absolute application of the
ERA; in those cases, the court did not strike the classifications
without first examining them in terms of the characteristics which
purported to justify different treatment. If the characteristic was
not peculiar to one sex, the sex-based classification served no legiti-
mate purpose and hence was invalid.5' The court never inquired into
the state's compelling interest in maintaining the classification be-
cause it never reached that question in its analysis, which fell some-
where between the judicial deference of a rational basis test and the
rigidity of an absolute application of the ERA.52
Cases dealing with sex discrimination in high school athletics
have generally been decided on equal protection grounds.53 In Reed
48. See text at notes 12-16 supra.
49. E.g., Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 93, 320 A.2d 139, 140 (1974).
50. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
51. For example, in Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974), the court found
that the crucial characteristic in an award for support was financial capability, which could
not always be presumed on the part of the husband.
52. In Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974), the court used concepts
from various equal protection tests. It characterized the interest in freedom from lawfully-
imposed confinement as "fundamental" public policy. Id. at 297, 328 A.2d at 856. Later in
the opinion, the court stated, "We perceive no basis, let alone a rational basis, for predicating
eligibility for parole on a person's sex," and supported its conclusion with equal protection
cases utilizing the rational basis test. Id. at 298, 328 A.2d at 856 (footnote omitted). Yet it
prefaced its discussion with the broad proposition that sex might no longer be used as an
exclusive classifying tool in the Commonwealth. Id. at 296, 328 A.2d at 855.
53. See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (high
school must sponsor teams for both boys and girls in non-contact sports); Morris v. Michigan
State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (temporary injunction against enforcement
of state-wide athletic association regulation upheld where girls were restricted from playing
on boys' tennis team); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb.
1972) (injunction against prohibition of females from men's golf team); Haas v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972) (girls banned from golf team).
But see Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972), where the court
applied the rational basis test and found no violation of equal protection due to the physical
and psychological differences between boys and girls. See generally Comment, Sex Discrimi-
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v. Reed,54 the Supreme Court examined a classification which ef-
fected dissimilar treatment of men and women. It has been sug-
gested that Reed established a compromise test somewhere between
the rational basis and the more exacting strict scrutiny tests; the
Court did not label sex-based classifications as suspect, but its lan-
guage connoted a certain sensitivity to such classifications.55 To
date the Court has found it unnecessary to determine whether sex-
based distinctions are suspect classifications."s Proponents of the
federal ERA, however, maintain that it was the legislative creation
of a new suspect classification which would be defensible only when
the state could demonstrate a compelling interest.57
The disposition of a sex-based classification under the strict scru-
tiny test would depend on what the court would consider a compel-
ling state interest." In prior Pennsylvania ERA cases, there was no
need to continue testing a sex-based classification after the court
had determined that the classification did not further its intended
purpose.59 In the context of sports, however, it may be that there is
no such thing as a neutral characteristic: in reality the athlete's skill
is directly related to his or her sex.8 0 Had the court analyzed the
nation in Interscholastic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 535 (1974); Note, Sex
Discrimination in High School Athletics, 57 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1972); Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED.
664 (1975).
54. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (probate code provision which gave mandatory preference to men
over women when both applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate
violated the equal protection clause).
55. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972). But cf. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a majority of the Court refused to adopt the strict
scrutiny test for sex-based classifications. See also 12 DuQ. L. REV. 982 (1974).
In Percival v. City of Phila., 12 Pa. Commw. 628, 317 A.2d 667 (1974), the PIAA court may
have tried a version of the Reed approach when it reasoned:
Did the people intend [the ERA] to do more than provide that equality of rights may
not be denied or abridged on account of sex where sex bears no rational relationship
to the object of the legislation; or did they intend that sex, like race and color, should
be a wholly impermissible basis for state regulation? We are inclined to believe that
they meant more than the former and less than the latter.
Id. at 639, 317 A.2d at 673 (emphasis added).
56. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975).
57. See 116 CONG. REc. 28003-04 (1970) (remarks of Representative Dwyer). But see
Brown, supra note 33, at 880-81.
58. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do we need a Constitutional
Amendment? 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499, 1509-12 (1971).
59. See text at notes 49-53 supra.
60. The federal ERA appears amenable to any classification so long as it is not overtly
tied to a sexual stereotype. 118 CONG. REc. 9571 (1972).
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PIAA by-law in this light, it might have asked if the state had a
compelling interest in maintaining the distinction." Had it consid-
ered athletic competition as part of a school's curriculum," or seri-
ously appraised the Association's justifications for the by-law63 after
hearing the evidence at trial, the court might have reached a differ-
ent result.
PIAA presented an awkward situation. The court must have fore-
seen-although it did not acknowledge-the difficulties accompa-
nying the elimination of sexual barriers in interscholastic athletic
competition. 4 It may have thought itself bound, however, by ERA
precedents which it felt dictated an absolute stand against classifi-
cation by sex.65 Had the court used a strict scrutiny standard, it
might have found a compelling state interest to uphold the classifi-
cation. Under this approach the ERA would have had a certain
desirable flexibility6 which may have been lost in PIAA.
Jacqueline A. Mikula
61. It is interesting that the burden of justification would have been on the state; in PIAA,
the state was both plaintiff and, by implication through the state action concept, the defen-
dant.
62. See note 34 supra.
63. See text at notes 18-25 supra.
64. Now that girls are eligible for formerly all-male teams, team members must be se-
lected on the basis of some neutral qualifying characteristic. See text at notes 26-28 supra.
In all likelihood, the characteristic will be skill. If skill is the determining factor, only the
most talented girls will be able to compete. The net result of PIAA, therefore, could be a
decrease in female participation in high school athletics.
65. See 18 Pa. Commw. at 50-51, 334 A.2d at 841-42.
66. Under a strict scrutiny standard, affirmative action would be available to secure
actual equality. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
In such a program, sex-based classification would be necessary to compensate women for past
discrimination. Implementation could take various forms: females capable of varsity compe-
tition, for example, could be placed in competition with males while girls' teams were main-
tained-perhaps at a lower level of competition-to provide further opportunity for athletic
advancement. But cf. Brown, supra note 33, at 903-04.
